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The share of floating-rate loans and fixed-rate loans varies across countries and over time. This 
is a study about how the movements in monetary policy interest rates defined by the European 
Central Bank and the changes in the yield curve of the countries influence the share of floating-
rate loans. Moreover, there is also an attempt to study the impact of this type of interest rate 
selection with the main components of profitability in banks. Using a ten-country panel and 
econometric models, I find that the monetary policy instruments do influence the choice of loans 
with variable rates. However, the effects of this choice on banks’ profitability is less significant, 
suggesting that it depends on other components. These conclusions contribute to the literature 
related with monetary policy and banks’ interest rate risk management. 
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The economic recession caused by the financial crisis, tied to a disproportionate lending, 
produced a large negative impact in aggregate output and employment. Right after these effects 
on the financial and economic conditions, and because of the direct impact that interest rate 
changes have on economies, Central Banks took a firm stand by implementing some 
unconventional policies in which was included the setting of negative interest rates. In the case 
of the European area, European Central Bank (ECB) set a low-interest-rate policy that is 
currently influencing the banking sector, and which duration remains uncertain. These lower 
policy rates worked as a mechanism that Central Banks used in order to promote price (and 
financial) stability. The unconventional policy tools combine: 1) large-scale asset purchases; 2) 
lending facilities; 3) forward guidance; and 4) negative rates (thus going beyond the so-called 
zero-lower bond (ZLB)).  
The low-interest-rate policy has a positive impact on the economy, as long as we are only 
focused on a short-term period. However, the side-effects of this interest-rate policy will only 
be seen slightly afterwards. Associated with this circumstance, there is uncertainty if these such 
low rates are a threat for the financial/ banking sector. The questions “What will happen when 
interest rates return to normal levels?” and “How is bank performance going to react?” are a 
concern across society. These issues are important not only for those who are embedded in 
financial area like banks and consumers, but for the whole citizens that can be affected by this 
matter.  
The interest rates changes have a significant influence on the main components of bank 
profitability, such as return on assets, net interest income, non-interest income and provisions. 
Even with the higher “gap” related with customers wanting more long-term loans and quick 
access to savings, it is believed that banks record the necessary levels of capital to mitigate the 
eventual breaks in performance that higher interest rates might lead to. Nevertheless, 
macroeconomic conditions play a major role in the way monetary policy affects profitability of 
banks. If there is a contraction in the economy, that means the demand for loan and savings can 
decrease causing low margins and affecting profitability.  
In the universe of loans, there are some that are tied to a fixed interest rate and others linked 
to an adjustable interest rate. A fixed interest rate is used in a fixed rate contract type, in which 
is charged a nominal interest rate that is constant during the entire life of the contract. On the 
opposite, an adjustable interest rate is linked to another classification of loan: an adjustable rate 
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contract, meaning that this type of loan has an interest rate that changes over time, because is 
attached to a specific benchmark. It is still not so clear if all the actions related with the 
unconventional monetary policies applied by Central Banks are somehow related with the 
supply of loans with variable or fixed interest rates. 
The traditional business of banking is characterized by short-term deposits funding long-term 
loans and this maturity mismatch creates an exposure to interest rate risk. However, banks have 
the possibility to transfer their interest rate risk to borrowers through a variable rate contract.  
For all that was referred above, the ambition related with this work consists in evaluating how 
monetary policy can affect profitability and risk behaviour in the European banking sector, 
comparing the differences between the European countries that use fixed and floating rates. An 
analysis regarding risk and profit of banks in a higher interest rate context is also a desired topic 
to cover. 
Using a panel data that includes observations from some European countries, it is regressed a 
GLS model to determine whether monetary policy influences the decision between fixed and 
floating interest rates and how this decision affects profitability. 
The dissertation is structured as follows: in Section 2 is presented an overview of the European 
banking sector. In Section 3 is summarized the literature review regarding the purpose of this 
work: monetary policy, profitability and fixed and floating rate loans. In Section 4 is detailed the 
methodology and data used in this work. In Section 5 the results of the empirical analysis 






2. The European banking sector 
The role of the Central Bank  
Central Banks are responsible for monetary policy, determining the direction of the interest 
rates in the economy. Therefore, monetary policy influences the short-term interest rate directly 
through the central bank policy rate and the slope of the yield curve, in a more indirect manner, 
due to the management of market expectations about the future policy rate direction and the 
impact on the price of government securities. Regarding practical actions, in mid-2010 the 
European Central Bank (ECB) introduced the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) to provide 
critical liquidity injections in the European banks in order to overcome solvency problems in 
dysfunctional segments. Right in the end of the following year, it was implemented a mechanism 
called LTROs (Long Term Refinancing Operations) with the ambition to contribute for long-term 
liquidity and to stabilize funding conditions.  
These non-standard policies implemented by the ECB had a repercussion on the slope of the 
yield curve, but some critics referred that it was the only way to overcome the effects of the 
crisis1. In fact, the influence of the yield curve became a better stimulus for the economy since 
policy rates were nearly zero. For that reason, there was a commitment to guide forward policy 
rates and to purchase assets in a large-scale (quantitative easing). The combination of these 
policies has a significant impact on the yield curve at all maturities. 
The traditional economic models are reliant on the official interest rates set by Central Banks 
and are quite efficient in normal economic times. With these unconventional policies, interest 
rates set by Central banks were nearly zero, the “zero lower bound”, and the effects of these 
policies were hard to quantify by economists. In order to find a way to measure these 
unconventional policies, some researchers suggested a different interest rate approach: the 
shadow rate2. This new tool would give the possibility to improve current economic models and 
to measure the actual effects of monetary policy in the economy, as well as to track movements 
from several benchmark data and can even work when interest rates are in a negative path. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, the short-term rate and the shadow rate are different reflections of the 
monetary policy established by the European Central Bank between 2007 and 2018. 
                                                          
1 See El-Erian, M. A. (2016). 
2 The shadow rate was initially found by Jing Cynthia Wu and Fan Dora Xia, from University of Chicago 
academic and Merrill Lynch's, respectively. In Wu-Xia shadow rate the structural relationship between 
macro variables and this rate in not broken and that reveals that unconventional monetary policy did 
have some positive effect on the economy. 
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Figure 1 – Short-term rate versus shadow rate 
 
Impact on profitability 
After the financial crisis, profitability gains improved due to a reduction in provisions associated 
with bad loans and asset quality also suffered an upgrade. The established monetary policies 
were an effective response to financial and economic issues since they created an opportunity 
to improve bank funding through central bank liquidity and to boost borrower creditworthiness 
with a reduction in the cost of debt. The higher yield curve slope turned out to contribute for an 
overall positive effect in Return on Assets (ROA). However, the following years, characterized by 
reductions in the short-term rates and also a shrink on the yield curve, led to downsize in ROA. 
The implementation of standard and non-standard monetary policies has also a direct impact 
on the diminishing of net interest income. That is because most of Credit institutions, especially 
small and medium-sized, have their business models reliant on income earned through interests 
and the actual market conditions might release a problem of income squeeze. This might be 
viewed in two ways: 
 Loans with higher yields are reaching maturity and being substituted by lower-yielding 
loans; 
 The narrow spread between short-term and long-term interest rates is generating a 
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In addition, when both the short-term interest rates and the yield curve slope increases, there 
is a positive effect on net interest income of banks. Higher short-term rates bumps their interest 
rate margins, along with steeper yield curve that enables banks to raise returns from maturity 
transformation. On the other side, there is a negative correlation between the level of interest 
rates and non-interest income, partially offsetting the positive effect on net interest income. So, 
when the short-term rate increases, there is a reduction in non-interest income over total assets 
due to the effect on the valuation of securities and the same happens when the slope of the 
yield curve rises. Although, the interest rate structure has a positive relationship with provisions, 
more specifically, when interest rates increase there is a raise in loan loss provisions due to the 
influence in default probabilities and service costs. Thus, bank profitability improves when 
interest rates are high, meaning that the negative effects identified on non-interest income and 
provisions are neutralized by the positive outcome observed on net interest income. There is 
evidence that ROA increases if the short-term rate rises from 0% to 1%3 due to a tight monetary 
policy and if there is a rise in the slope of the yield curve.  
However, all the evidence about low interest rate periods being synchronized with lower or even 
negative bank profitability, does not necessarily mean a causal relationship. This relationship is 
a consequence of the interest rates set by central banks when the economy is facing a phase of 
low performance4. Given that, the low interest rate policy is bad for the profitability of a bank in 
the long-term but is usually offset by the recovery of the economic conditions. 
These low levels of rates enabled the increase of capital gains and the reduction of Non-
performing Loans (NPL), but are also correlated with lower net interest margins (difference 
between interest earned on assets and interest paid on deposits) and that can be expressed in 
the following manners5: 
I. As interest rates decline, expenses tied to interests face a lower reduction than 
income and that means a smaller net interest margin; 
II. In more developed economies there is an opposite effect when interest rates are 
lower; 
III. Net interest margins are affected in a negative way as long as interest rates maintain 
low levels. 
                                                          
3 See eg Borio, Gambacorta and Hofmann (2015) 
4 See eg Altavilla, Boucinha and Peydró (2017). 
5 See eg Claessens, Coleman and Donnelly (2017). 
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Generating profit and creating credit are two prominent features of banks profitability. Hence, 
a bank with higher levels of profit can easily attract capital from outside investors and also 
generate capital inside through net earnings retained by the bank. This profit capacity enhances 
the bank image and boosts the economy, leading to the stability of the financial system. Due to 
the concern about the decline of net interest margins and profitability, banks are trying to find 
other sources to improve their revenue and increase their profit margins. Lengthening the 
maturity structure of assets, finding new sources of income through the raise of fees and 
commissions and using cost-cutting measures are some of the manners to overcome this issue. 
Additionally, banks can consciously put money into riskier assets, go for hedging activities and 
retain capital as a cushion against losses. There is also a concern about the risks that banks can 
hold. Bank’s stakeholders are the most interested in understanding how low interest rates can 
affect performance and that can vary across the distinct characteristics of banks such as interest 
rate exposure, degree of maturity transformation and use of hedging activities.  
 
Risk management and banks’ characteristics 
The impacts caused by the adjustments of interest rates affect each bank in a different way. For 
instance, a small bank is more affected on the short-term by changes in rates since it is linked to 
traditional channels that are more reluctant to negotiate prices and that are associated with 
floating rate loans. The characteristics that differentiate small and large banks are their balance 
sheet composition and their own business models. An institution with more long-term assets 
than liabilities is vulnerable to the rise of interest rates: as interest rates increase, a bank that 
has a higher percentage of long-term assets than long-term liabilities is going to experience 
losses due to the quicker repricing of liabilities compared to the asset side. In Figure 2 there is 




Figure 2 - Banks' balance sheet example 
Typically, banks use adjustable rates on short-term funding and that naturally means that banks 
might be more willing to supply floating rate loans. If it is possible to raise long-term funds with 
a fixed rate, banks are also capable to supply fixed rate loans, considering that an exposure to 
interest rate risk is kept6. Besides that, banks are also able to supply fixed rate loans and floating 
rate loans in the same scale as long as they are predisposed to hedge in a deeply way and that 
means the analysis of bank specific characteristics is crucial to clarify banks' exposure to interest 
rate risk. 
Fixed-rate assets and liabilities can have different maturities. In the case of floating rate assets 
and liabilities, it could have different repricing periods, as well as base rates of different 
maturities. The decision between fixed rate loans and variable rate loans is driven by demand 
and supply factors. On the demand side, the level of education of the borrower and its financial 
condition play a major role in this matter. Borrowers’ with a deeper knowledge know that a fixed 
rate contract originates more costs that a floating rate contract, but they are also aware of the 
unpredictability of an adjustable rate type of mortgage. On the supply side, bank funding and 
liquidity conditions are determinant. Essentially, the composition of liabilities influences the 
offer of a certain type of loan. Lending policies are defined by banks according to the demand 
conditions of each country. For instance, in a country with higher default rate, a bank might 
exclude giving a variable rate loan if they consider that would hurt that economy. There is also 
a evidence7 about countries that have more residential loans linked to adjustable rates record a 
higher historical volatility of inflation and that contributes to a larger insurance through an 
adjustable rate contract. This happens because when banks realize that the level of volatility 
                                                          
6 Hoffmann et al. (2017) 
7 Albertazzi, Fringuelloti and Ongena (2018) 
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inflation is high, they try to protect themselves from inflation risk by setting higher interest rates 
on fixed rate loans and due to this higher costs, borrowers prefer to choose a loan with an 
adjustable rate.  
As illustrated in Figure 3, Europe is characterized by a huge discrepancy according to the grant 
of fixed and adjustable rate loans for house purchase across the constituent countries. Belgium, 
France, Germany and Netherlands hold more loans with a fixed rate, whereas Austria, Greece, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal possess a bigger percentage of floating rate loans (ECB, 2009; Campbell, 
2012). The share of fixed rate loans to total new loans for house purchase is also different 
amongst the countries, being Germany and Portugal, the ones maintaining the type of interest 
rate granted more constant, but in the contrary, Italy and Greece record a higher level of interest 
rate variation (ECB, 2009). Interest-rate risk tied to banking sector differs across countries, which 
have direct consequences on financial stability.  
 
Figure 3 - Variable-rate mortgages in euro area countries [Hoffmann, Langfield, Pierobon and Vuillemey (2017)] 
Moreover, the risks related to the current low interest rates environment are not the only issues 
that must be supervised. Experts are aware that the turning point of the level of interest rates 
has to be investigated, meaning that the end of this low rate environment might be a source of 
major risk. Because of that, the responsibility to bear interest rate risk is important, considering 
that the transmission of monetary is affected by the allocation of interest rate risk and that this 





3. Literature review 
More than ten years ago, the subprime borrowers in the US have run into massive defaults that 
led to enormous declines in portfolios with asset-backed securities (ABS), which were quite well 
rated. Despite the intervention by the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve, this subprime crisis 
had a contagious effect on global financial markets (Longstaff, 2010). 
The U.S. subprime crisis in 2007 led to a destruction of equity in several banks all over the world, 
in late 2008, culminating in the failure of Lehman Brothers. However, the bad performance was 
not the same across banks. Macroeconomic disparities did have a great impact in the 
performance of banks during the crisis since countries with account surpluses dealt with a better 
efficiency in its banks. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) use the variation of stock returns of large banks 
across the world during the period of July 2007 to December 2008 to evaluate which factors had 
the most importance for the weak performance of banks. As some theories, the results highlight 
the short-term capital market funding. Previously to the credit crisis, banks with better 
performance felt lower returns and fewer leverage. Only large banks from countries that had 
some limits on bank activities demonstrated a better performance during the crisis, in a general 
analysis there is no correlation between performance of banks and the differences in regulations 
of each countries.  
The global financial crisis led to a freeze in the interbank markets as well as some liquidity actions 
via Central Banks. The business practices in the banking sector and the regulatory and 
supervisory framework suffered a huge reformulation. More specifically, the European banking 
industry faced a remarkable transformation since the financial crisis. Through the analysis of the 
bank’s financial statements, net interest income is still the most important component of 
revenues. Comparing to ten-years ago, the share of net interest income to total revenues has 
increased from 35% to more than half (52%) (Schildbach, 2017).  
In line with that, Borio, Gambacorta, and Hofmann (2015) developed an analysis about the 
impact of monetary policy on the interest rate structure (the level of short-term rate and the 
slope of the yield curve), in the main components of bank profitability (net interest income, non-
interest income and loan loss provisions), including ROA, where specific macroeconomic 
conditions and bank-specific characteristics were under control. The findings indicate the 
relationship between the interest rate structure and ROA is positive, meaning that profitability 
is improved with higher rates and a steeper yield curve. 
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The determinants of bank profitability are divided in two categories. More internally, the bank-
specific ratios, are equity over total assets, loans over total assets, non-interest earning assets 
over total assets. The external factors are linked to macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, 
money supply growth, inflation, real interest and tax rate (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998). 
In the case of standard monetary policies, it generates different outcomes on the core factors 
related with bank profitability: affect positively loan loss provisions and negatively net interest 
income. The transmission of monetary policy to bank profitability must be in line with the unique 
characteristics of each bank’s balance sheet. A more accommodative monetary policy is more 
suitable with banks with higher operational efficiency and banks with lower asset quality. The 
profitability of a bank is also a consequence of a good balance sheet management such as 
capital, liquidity, nonperforming loans and efficiency. 
The impact of monetary policy actions on stock market returns, i.e., effects on both debtholders’ 
net wealth and credit risk, are crucial for the stability of the financial system since debt matters 
to estimate bank’s value.  Bank profitability is highly likely to be affected by a low interest rate 
environment but only for an extended period and these long-term consequences are usually 
offset by the favourable effects that these expansionary monetary policies have on real 
economic activity. In fact, expected real economic activity is needed to evaluate the impact of 
monetary policy on bank profitability (Altavilla, Boucinha and Peydró, 2017). Nevertheless, if 
expected aggregate economic and financial conditions are under control, we can observe that 
monetary policy conditions and bank profitability are no longer correlated. This means that the 
low monetary policy rates are associated with lower bank profits only in the case that the 
analysis does not include the control of the expected (in addition to current) economic and 
financial conditions. 
In the initial stage of the crisis, and now taking into account the U.S. banking sector, the decrease 
in the federal funds rate was the main monetary policy tool used by the Federal Reserve to 
revitalize the economy and control inflation. Nevertheless, after 2008 the federal funds rate has 
been facing values close to zero and the Fed tried a different approach to increase economic 
stimulus. Since an additional decrease of the federal funds rate would not be effective, the Fed 
started to purchase assets in a large scale (the quantitative easing tool) and guide them in order 
to influence interest rates in a long-term perspective, consisting in their unconventional policy 
mechanism. These unusual monetary policy actions turned out to be difficult to analyze as the 
economic environment suffered a change. In line with the assessments developed by Bullard 
(2012) and Krippner (2012), Wu and Xia (2014) is also an important contribute for the current 
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debates regarding the importance of the shadow rate to measure and to describe the innovative 
monetary policy approach at ZLB. The shadow rate term structure model (SRTSM) was used as 
a new tool to measure the impact of unconventional monetary policy set by the Fed on the 
economy.  
Equally important to this work is the problem of interest rate loans' choice.  Campbell and Cocco 
(2003) show that this issue might involve many considerations. In this framework, borrowers 
facing low level of income and savings would probably choose a loan with a reduced interest 
rate at the time of its application. Since a fixed interest rate usually requires a term premium 
and a cost of prepayment option, a borrower facing these circumstances would go for a loan 
with an adjustable rate and this means facing some uncertainty regarding the periodic 
payments. Nevertheless, if a household has a low capacity to bear risk due to high loan-to-
income ratio and low financial wealth, would likely choose a fixed-rate mortgage (FRM). A few 
years later, Campbell, J. Y. (2012), explains that macroeconomic outcomes might be influenced 
by the form of the mortgage system as it can adjust the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy and the political constraints on the central bank. Consequently, the macroeconomic 
history of a country works as an influencer on its mortgage system. Countries with prevailing 
FRMs and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) react differently to increases in interest rates. In a 
FRM system, an increase in interest rates does not change the mortgage payments of existing 
borrowers, only new borrowers are directly affected. Although, in an ARM system, an increase 
in interest rates is harmful for prevailing borrowers since their payments also increase. This 
might cause a borrowing constraint and in this sense, monetary policy tries to adapt its actions 
according to the type of mortgage system. Specifically, a history of volatile inflation is strongly 
associated with the use of ARMs because this macroeconomic condition makes nominal FRMs 
with prepayment options excessively risky for lenders and therefore too expensive for 
borrowers. It is also questioned why mortgage systems in southern Europe have predominantly 
ARMs even after the introduction of the euro but there an intuition that it might result from the 
difficult and expensive task to educate borrowers about mortgage contracts. 
An important issue is also related with how current and future expected interest rates can affect 
the variation of ARM shares in terms of total new mortgages. The role played by the historic 
volatility of inflation, along with the cross-country variation, are critical features to take in 
consideration (Badarinza et al., 2017). In the demand side, a higher spread between long-term 
and short-term interest, stronger economic growth and less volatility of unemployment are not 
the favorable macroeconomic conditions to get an ARM (Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer, 2017).  
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Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2012) and Garriga, Kydland, and Sustek (2013) demonstrate that 
the share of ARMs in an economy in entirely related with the transmission of monetary policy 
because with higher ARM shares, the economy is more responsive to monetary policy. 
More related with the share of FRMs and taking into account the countries where the sovereign 
debt crisis caused more damages, Albertazzi, Fringuellotti and Ongena (2018) developed an 
analysis in the euro area in order to explain the conditions that determine the local demand for 
credit and the characteristics of banks that supply credit. As well as with ARMs, it was found that 
country demand factors explain better the variation of the share of FRMs to total new 
mortgages. There was an effort to guarantee the equal weight of these conclusions to all country 
observations and due to that, they adopt an approach that includes each country demand 
indicators. It was found that the Historical Inflation Volatility is the more statistically significant 
variable. Also relevant, an increase in Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP and in Outstanding 
RMBS (residential mortgage-backed securities) to GDP lead to a growth in the share of FRMs per 
country (the dependent variable considered in the analysis). 
Hoffmann, P., Langfield, S., Pierobon, F., and Vuillemey G. (2017) state their findings are 
consistent with the heterogeneity with which each country is exposed being related with type 
of loan fixed by that country. Some banks benefit from an increase in interest rates but other 
can be hurt once the transmission of monetary policy is perceived in each country differently 
and because of that, the bank balance sheet channel is expected to be different across countries. 
The findings are clear: banks that operate in countries that use more fixed-rates are more 
affected by increases in interest rates. Thus, higher interest rates tend to have a good impact in 
banks that operate in countries that use variable-rate contracts in a large scale since there is a 
quick re-pricing of income in these assets and the present value loss is not as severe as for fixed-
rate assets. In a conservative point of view, an increase in interest rates would create a maturity 
mismatch on the one hand, as a result of the present value of their assets being inferior against 
the present value of their liabilities and on the other hand due to the interest expense paid on 
liabilities increases faster than the interest income earned from assets. Differently from this 
traditional knowledge, the results demonstrate that an increase in interest rates would benefit 
nearly half of the banks included in the sample when it comes to net worth and income. 
Regarding the average share of new residential loans, in the euro area, with variable interest 
rate, between 2011 and 2015, it is possible to identify two distinct groups: Belgium, Germany, 
France, Netherlands and Slovakia characterized by a low share of variable-rate mortgages (7% 




Moench, Vickery, and Aragon (2010), besides being more focused in the US, study how the 
unconventional monetary policy set by the Federal Reserve affects mortgage choice for new 
mortgages and propose that FRMs have become relatively more attractive as a result of the 
large-scale purchases of fixed-rate mortgage-backed securities.  
Fuster, A. and Vickery, J. (2014) suggest that lenders reduce the supply of FRMs in an 
unreasonably way as long as loans are difficult to securitize and can be retained in portfolio. This 
shrinkage in FRM supply could be implemented by lenders through an increase in mortgage 
interest rates and fees applicable on FRMs, in order to induce borrowers to substitute FRMs for 
ARMs. In a more severe way, lenders could simply limit the supply of certain mortgage contracts. 
The share of FRMs might be reduced if there are regulatory or legislative actions that discourage 
securitization, such as the implementation of stringent risk retention requirements. 
Banks have their liabilities attached to floating rates, so there is a preference to lend to firms 
also with floating rates (Kirti, 2017). By doing that, banks pass interest-rate risk to borrowers. 
Banks have their loans and securities financed by deposit liabilities and internal wealth. These 
deposit liabilities are considered short-term and consequently floating. If there is an increment 
in interest rates, deposit interest expense rises. With that, there will be a decrease in net income 
as long as banks hold merely fixed-rate assets. If there is really a mismatch between banks’ 
assets and liabilities, they need to be cautious about the uncertainty of the future interest rates. 
Having in mind Froot et al. (1993), banks and firms are risk averse as a result of financial frictions. 
This risk aversion is important for the exposure to interest rate risk. Changes in interest rates 
can be associated with asset liability management techniques and hedging activities used to 
diminish interest rate risk. Since there are associated costs with the hedging activity, banks make 
floating-rate loans to firms in order to overcome the mismatch in their balance sheet. Therefore, 
banks can tolerate higher risk when their access to securitization markets is more feasible and 
these conditions are a comparative advantage for the issuance of FRMs (Foà, Gambacorta, Guiso 
& Mistrulli, 2015).  
Despite significant leverage, bank net interest margins have historically been very stable 
(Flannery 1981, English 2002, English et al. 2013). 
It is complex to manage interest rate risk since it can be expressed in a few forms: repricing risk, 
yield curve risk and basis risk. If the rates suddenly go up in a high level, the performance of bank 
earnings would be affected since the short-term response is not effective as the average yield 
on assets and liabilities is highly affected by changes in interest rates and as so, we are in the 
presence of a repricing risk event (English, 2002). 
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Basten, Guin and Koch (2018) contribute to the literature on banks’ interest rate risk 
management, as well as to the household mortgage choice. In line with Santomero (1983) and 
Kirti (2017), they argue that banks try to reduce the mismatch among their liabilities and assets 
by offering loans with shorter fixation periods. With the increase in interest rates, the disposable 
income for households is reduced, especially for those that have ARMs, and that can cause a 
payment failure of their mortgages. Banks might face a credit risk increment when these 
conditions are verified. The repricing frequency of a retail bank’s assets is typically lower than 
the frequency of the majority of their liabilities. Although, there is a possibility to hedge this risk 
exposure through interest rate swaps (Vuillemey, 2017), most of banks retain part of interest 
rate risk exposure on their balance sheets (Purnanandam, 2007; Hoffmann et al., 2017; 
Vuillemey, 2017). This might be instigated by the collateral constraints related with the hedging 
activities through swaps (Rampini & Viswanathan, 2010; Rampini & Viswanathan, 2013; Rampini 
et al, 2017). The hedge of all risks would reduce the profitability of the bank business even with 
fairly priced swaps. 
As well as banks which did not receive government assistance in the crisis have minor levels of 
interest rate risk (Chaudron,2016), the impact of a change in interest rates in a bank is larger 
when there is a higher exposure to interest rate risk in lending activities (Beutler, Bichsel, Bruhin 





4. Methodology and Data  
This paper analyses the consequences of the implementation of monetary policies on European 
banks by country, regarding profitability and risk, through a comparison between the use of 
fixed and adjustable interest rates. The steps attached to this analysis are stated below: 
I. Focus on the euro area, extract from the ECB data that contains the information about 
which European countries mainly use fixed and floating rates; 
II. Accounts for macroeconomic variables that are relevant to translate each countries’ 
background; 
III. Uses data from the ECB countries’ balance sheet, more specifically the main profitability 
components; 
IV. Studies the average impact of monetary policy on bank’s type of interest rate given to 
borrowers in some EU countries;  
V. Evaluates the impact of the type on interest rate linked to loans changes on the main 
components of bank profitability: return on assets, net interest income, non-interest 
income and provisions; 
VI. Examines whether a period of low interest rates might impair bank profitability; 
VII. Explores the main channels though which monetary policy actions might influence bank 
profitability. 
The analysis is mainly focused on ten EU countries8: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
In terms of data selection, it was collected from different sources and covering datasets from 
December 2007 and September 2018, in a quarterly basis.  
The analysis exploits how the share of variable-rate loans in total loans is affected by the 
monetary policy instituted. Furthermore, there is an attempt to link this share of variable-rate 
loans given by banks to households and non-financial corporations with bank profitability, 
through the lens of countries’ bank profitability drivers.  
                                                          
8 The variables intended to include in this analysis were not available for all EU countries. Because of 
that limitation, the chosen countries were the ones in which was most possible to gather the wanted 
information.  
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A set of variables was chosen according to its specification and relevance to the purpose of this 
analysis and are stated below9: 
1) Role of monetary policy 
In this sense some financial variables are taken from Bloomberg and the last from Wu-
Xia shadow rates website: 
 Short-term rate 
 Yield curve 
 Shadow rate 
Short-term rate is the three-month overnight index swap (OIS); Country-specific 
slope is the difference between ten and two-year sovereign yields. 
2) Macroeconomic outlook 
There was a selection of two macroeconomic indicators sourced from Eurostat: 
 GDP growth 
 HICP inflation 
3) Bank balance sheet characteristics summarized by country 
The main profitability components were collected from the European Central Bank: 
 Return on assets 
 Net interest income 
 Net non-interest income 
 Provisions 
This data belongs to ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and for the purpose of this work it 
was used the Consolidated Banking Data (CBD2 dataset), downloaded for EU countries 
that are subject of analysis in this work, with a quarterly frequency. 
4) Risk assessment indicators  
A dataset related with the monitoring of systemic risk was collected from European 
Central Bank: 
 Share of variable rate loans in total loans to households and non-financial 
corporations; 
 Annual growth rate of new loans to households and non-financial corporations. 
4.1. Summary statistics 
Subsequently, the main variables selected were turned into descriptive statistics. 
                                                          
9 Variables are defined in percentage unless otherwise specified. 
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Table I displays the summary statistics for financial, macroeconomic, balance sheet and risk 
assessment variables used in the empirical analysis. Additionally, the average value of each 
variable used in this sample is clustered by country, in the Appendix. 
Table I - Summary statistics of the variables 
   N Mean St.Dev p25 Median p75 min max 
ECBShadowRate 440 -3.416 8.216 -9.406 -1.893 1.056 -18.914 12.281 
ShorttermRate 440 .518 1.23 -.287 .105 .598 -.361 4.293 
CountrySlope 440 1.596 .949 1.102 1.626 2.199 -5.559 6.383 
GDP growth_rate 410 .958 3.513 0 1.2 2.2 -8.3 25.1 
HICP 440 .367 .675 -.1 .3 .7 -1.5 2.7 
ROA 255 .136 .728 .086 .254 .431 -7.257 .931 
NII 255 1.068 .47 .708 1.099 1.413 .223 2.198 
NNII 255 .625 .415 .35 .569 .864 -1.614 1.834 
PROV 233 -.034 .082 -.047 -.014 -.002 -.846 .264 
FRLshareHNFC 390 76.935 18.828 62.921 84.217 93.254 25.671 97.414 
NWLgrowthHNFC 440 -4.646 43.516 -29.93 -6.812 17.546 -147.154 190.455 
 
 
The interest rate metrics related with monetary policy, ECB shadow rate and short-term rate, 
present different values of the statistics shown above. The average ECB shadow rate is negative 
(-3.416) when it is compared to the moderately positive value for the short-term rate (0.518). 
The minimum value is negative in both variables (ECB shadow rate, -18.914 and short-term rate, 
-0.361) and the maximum value is also aligned, being positive in these variables (ECB shadow 
rate, 12.281 and short-term rate, 4.293). The standard deviation of the ECB shadow rate is more 
substantial than the one displayed on short-term rate (8.216 versus 0.518) which means the first 
rate has a greater dispersion of values during the analysed time period. The results shown above 
are quite discrepant, meaning that these two rates, besides trying to demonstrate the same 
measures in terms of central bank policy rate, exhibit different values and that is related with its 
ability to capture the behaviour of the market in these monetary policy circumstances.  
The Country slope variable has a positive average value of 1.596 but a minimum value of -5.559 
and a maximum value of 6.383. Through an analysis by country (Table X), it is possible to observe 
two countries with negative values concerning the minimum values of its slope: Ireland (-1.526) 
and Portugal (-5.5595). These are obviously associated with the sovereign downgrades of bond 
issued by these countries during the critical period. Sovereign bonds are affected by three main 
factors: aggregate risk, country-specific risk and contagion risk. The aggregate risk factor is 
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entirely related with the monetary policy changes and market uncertainty. In its turn, country-
specific risk is driven mainly by changes in default probabilities on the sovereign debt. 
FRLshareHNFC presents an average value of 76.935 indicating that the majority of the countries 
included in this sample use more variable interest rates when granting new loans to households 
and non-financial corporations. This is in line with the evidences in ECB (2009) and Campbell 
(2012). As seen on Table X, Finland has the higher average FRLshare (95.65386) and the lowest 
one belongs to France (40.37726). This means that Finland has their banking sector tied to 
variable-rate loans and France, in an opposite direction, relies on fixed-rate loan contracts given 
to their borrowers. 
Regarding the profitability variables, the average of return on assets, net-interest income and 
non-net interest income show a positive value. Provisions, for instance, present a negative 
average value, but that is related with the sign expected for this component in the income 
statement since it is an expense account. That particularity about provisions means that the 
more negative is the value for this component, the more provisions were registered to overcome 
losses. In terms of the results by country, both Ireland and Portugal have the lowest average 
percentage on ROA (-0.532089 and -0.1113986) and the highest value belongs to Finland 
(0.4660846). Nevertheless, and in a general way, the return on assets of the economies included 
in this analysis did not exhibit a high percentage (0.136). These outcomes are in line with the 
low values recorded in the majority of the banks of some advanced economies, after the global 
financial crisis. The average net-interest income of the sample (1.068) is roughly homogenous 
across the countries presented on this sample. That is linked to the fact most of credit 
institutions, especially small and medium-sized, have their business models reliant on income 
earned through interest. Concerning non-net interest income, the average percentage is 0.625, 
but considering the analysis across countries, Belgium, Ireland and Netherlands present negative 
percentages about minimum values observed among this indicator. Italy has the highest average 
value (1.003456). When interest rates decrease, which was the case with the non-standard 
policies applied, non-interest income over total assets face an upturn because of the effect on 
the devaluation of securities. The average percentage of provisions is -0.014. However, Belgium 
is the only country with an average positive value in provisions (0.0019957), and having in mind 
what was explained above, it can mean that there was a less need to register provisions in 
Belgium banks’ accounts. In fact, when interest rates decrease, there is a reduction in loan loss 
provisions due to the shrinkage of default probabilities and service costs.  




According to Gujarati (2003), when there is a high (but not perfect) correlation between two or 
more independent variables, a value of 0.8, we are in the presence of a multicollinearity 
phenomenon. In this case, it is possible to observe a correlation coefficient of 0.815 between 
the variables “ShorttermRate” and “ECBShadowRate”. The correlation between these two 
variables is the highest among all variables and it makes sense as “ShorttermRate” and 
“ECBShadowRate are similar measures in terms of classification.  
It was found some statistically significance correlation, beside not being much strong, between 
the monetary policy variables and the share of loans with a floating rate, where ECB shadow 
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Table II - Pairwise correlations 

















 0.003 0.000 
 
(4) ECBShadowRate 0.251* 0.014 0.815* 1.000 
 0.000 0.764 0.000 
 
(5) GDP_growthrate -0.145* -0.228* -0.080 -0.231* 1.000 
 0.006 0.000 0.105 0.000 
 
(6) HICP 0.038 -0.091 0.248* 0.143* -0.012 1.000 
 0.460 0.057 0.000 0.003 0.813 
 
(7) ROA -0.094 -0.385* -0.009 -0.142* 0.157* 0.116 1.000 
 0.159 0.000 0.890 0.023 0.014 0.064 
 
(8) NII 0.366* 0.224* 0.315* 0.456* -0.101 -0.056 0.055 1.000 





















 0.005 0.994 0.002 0.007 0.006 0.058 0.000 0.000 
 
(10) PROV -0.197* -0.135* -0.074 -0.082 0.085 0.059 -0.045 -0.331* -0.228* 1.000 




-0.237* -0.340* 0.101* -0.135* 0.175* 0.001 0.311* -0.217* 0.003 0.012 1.000 








4.2. Econometric model 
In spite of the existing studies covering the impacts of monetary policy on bank’s profitability, 
there are not many studies in which the type of interest rates that lenders are willing to choose 
are included, most notably if it is taken into account the monetary policy settled as well as the 
effect on bank’s profitability drivers. In that sense, this empirical analysis consists on testing the 
following hypothesis: 
 H1: monetary policy influences the choice by borrowers and lenders in EU countries for 
floating-rate loans; 
 H2: the share of floating-rate loans affects the different components of profitability. 
We are in the presence of a panel data since there are many observations, followed over time 
(similar to cross-sectional data and time series). More specifically, and because this is a panel 
data characterized by a long period of time (large T) and for a limited set of countries (small N), 
this is a macro panel dataset. This is also a balanced panel data because most of the observations 
(N) are followed for the same number of periods (T) but there are also some missing values that 
can lead to an unbalanced panel data classification.  
Nevertheless, being a panel data means identifying the presence of unobservable omitted 
variables, which is a common problem in empirical studies. If omitted variables are correlated 
with the explanatory variables of a certain model, it leads to inconsistency, and that is why panel 
data is considered to be a powerful solution. 
In terms of the type of regressions, the main difference between Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is that in the first one takes the error term of the model 
into account and the last one ignores it. In a practical way, OLS is asymptotically as efficient as 
GLS except when there are auto correlated disturbances in the regression. The choice between 
GLS versus OLS is entirely related with the gain of asymptotic efficiency and the achievement of 
a smaller variance for n. 
For all that was just referred, and because this is considered mostly a balanced panel data, the 
method that is more suitable is GLS. This conclusion was confirmed by the results between GLS 
with fixed effects (FE) method and OLS, being the first one more efficient. The GLS method with 
random effects (RE) was not considered regarding the Hausman test that allows to choose 
between fixed and random effects. 
In the first hypothesis stated above, we use two different variables when it comes to the interest 
rate linked to monetary policy. The shadow rate is used as first plan, since it tends to be more 
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accurate, and the short-term interest rate is used as an alternative, just for an additional analysis 
and as a term of comparison. 
Regarding the second hypothesis, the monetary policy metrics become part of the country 
controls and comprise the country-specific slope, the ECB shadow rate and the short-term 
interest rate, in line for all that was stated above. 
The first equation for hypothesis 1 is presented below: 
FRLshareH&NFC𝐣,𝐭 = β1ECBShadowRatet + β2Slopej,t + ΩΧj,t + εj,t (1) 
FRLshareH&NFC j,t: share of new business loans with a floating rate or an initial rate fixed for a 
period of up to 1 year in total new business loans to households and non-financial corporations; 
β1 ECBShadowRate t: the level of short-term interest rate associated with unconventional 
monetary policies;  
β2 Slope j,t : coefficient associated with the country-specific slope, the difference between ten- 
and two-year sovereign yields of each country; 
ΩΧ j,t : country-specific controls, including: 
- GDP growth; 
- Expected inflation; 
- Country-fixed effects; 
- Annual growth rate of new loans to households and non-financial corporations. 
ε j,t: composite error that includes unobserved (individual) heterogeneity and time-varying error. 
The second equation related with hypothesis 1 and used as contingency is stated as follows: 
FRLshareH&NFC𝐣,𝐭 = β1Levelt + β2Slopej,t + ΩΧj,t + εj,t (2) 
FRLshareH&NFC j,t: share of new business loans with a floating rate or an initial rate fixed for a 
period of up to 1 year in total new business loans to households and non-financial corporations; 
β1 Levelt : coefficient associated with the level of short-term interest rate, three-month OIS;  
β2 Slopej,t : coefficient associated with the country-specific slope, the difference between ten- 
and two-year sovereign yields of each country; 
ΩΧj, : country-specific controls, including: 
- GDP growth; 
- Expected inflation; 
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- Country-fixed effects; 
- Annual growth rate of new loans to households and non-financial corporations. 
ε j,t: composite error that includes unobserved (individual) heterogeneity and time-varying error. 
Additionally, it is estimated the following equations for hypothesis 2:  
ROA𝐣,𝐭 = β1FRLshareH&NFC𝐣,𝐭 + ΩΧ𝐣,𝐭 +  ε𝐣,𝐭 (3) 
NII𝐣,𝐭 = β1FRLshareH&NFC𝐣,𝐭 + ΩΧ𝐣,𝐭 + ε𝐣,𝐭 (4) 
NNII𝐣,𝐭 = β1FRLshareH&NFC𝐣,𝐭 + ΩΧ𝐣,𝐭 + ε𝐣,𝐭 (5) 
PROV𝐣,𝐭 = β1FRLshareH&NFC𝐣,𝐭 + ΩΧ𝐣,𝐭 + ε𝐣,𝐭 (6) 
ROA j,t : return on assets of a country “j” at time “t”; 
NII j,t : net interest income of a country “j” at time “t”; 
NNII j,t : net non-interest income of a country “j” at time “t”; 
PROV j,t : provisions of a country “j” at time “t”; 
β1 FRLshareH&NFC j,t : share of new business loans with a floating rate or an initial rate fixed for 
a period of up to 1 year in total new business loans to households and non-financial 
corporations; 
 ΩΧ j,: country-specific controls, including: 
- GDP growth; 
- Expected inflation; 
- Country-fixed effects; 
- The level of short-term interest rate associated with unconventional monetary 
policies, ECB shadow rate, and the level of short-term interest rate, three-month 
OIS;  
- Country-specific slope, the difference between ten- and two-year sovereign yields 
of each country; 
- Annual growth rate of new loans to households and non-financial corporations. 




5. Empirical results 
5.1. Monetary policy and country characteristics  
In Table III and Table IV we presented the results of the regression related with hypothesis 1. 
In the first table, the central variable regarding the monetary policy interest rate included is 
shadow rate. Analysing the results, a great significance of the variables related with the 
monetary policy action is observed. Those two variables, ECB shadow rate and country slope, 
demonstrate to have a positive and significant effect on the share of loans to households and 
non-financial corporations with a floating rate. The addition of the control variables does not 
affect the results just mentioned. The results regarding this test imply that an increase in interest 
rates or a steepening of the term structure tends to lead to an increase in the share of loans to 
households and non-financial corporations with a floating rate. 
Table III - Generalized lest squared fixed effect regression results between monetary policy and the share of new 
loans with floating rate (including shadow rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC 
              
ECBShadowRate 0.567***  0.568*** 0.510***  0.535*** 
 (0.0269)  (0.0255) (0.0295)  (0.0294) 
CountrySlope  1.431*** 1.455***  0.107 1.002*** 
  (0.337) (0.222)  (0.325) (0.238) 
GDP_growthrate    -0.257*** -0.527*** -0.199*** 
    (0.0659) (0.0883) (0.0658) 
HICP    -0.595* 0.564 -0.533* 
    (0.314) (0.420) (0.308) 
NWLgrowthHNFC    -0.0270*** -0.0322*** -0.0204*** 
    (0.00519) (0.00734) (0.00530) 
       
Constant 78.86*** 74.64*** 76.53*** 79.05*** 77.51*** 77.42*** 
 (0.240) (0.628) (0.422) (0.258) (0.645) (0.463) 
       
Observations 390 390 390 363 363 363 
R-squared 0.540 0.045 0.586 0.564 0.192 0.585 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
Additionally, the analysis that includes the short-term interest rate in presented in Table IV. It is 
found that monetary policy through the short-term rate and country slope have a positive and 
significant effect on the share of loans to households and non-financial corporations with a 
floating rate, even when these two variables are considered together a higher association is 
observed. Even when the country controls are included, the results do not suffer any change, 
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being still possible to observe a greater significance. In fact, the results are quite similar 
compared to the outcomes observed in Table III. 
Table IV - Generalized lest squared fixed effect regression results between monetary policy and the share of new 
loans with floating rate (including short-term rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC 
              
ShorttermRate 2.210***  2.830*** 2.027***  2.393*** 
 (0.239)  (0.230) (0.214)  (0.225) 
CountrySlope  1.431*** 2.587***  0.107 1.324*** 
  (0.337) (0.300)  (0.325) (0.305) 
GDP_growthrate    -0.423*** -0.527*** -0.345*** 
    (0.0786) (0.0883) (0.0787) 
HICP    -0.452 0.564 -0.475 
    (0.388) (0.420) (0.379) 
NWLgrowthHNFC    -0.0430*** -0.0322*** -0.0365*** 
    (0.00638) (0.00734) (0.00640) 
Constant 75.77*** 74.64*** 71.30*** 76.66*** 77.51*** 74.23*** 
 (0.320) (0.628) (0.597) (0.318) (0.645) (0.641) 
       
Observations 390 390 390 363 363 363 
R-squared 0.184 0.045 0.318 0.357 0.192 0.390 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
According to the results obtained, a boost in interest rates would imply a rise of floating interest 
rate’s type of loans. 
This outcome is consistent with the notion of the interest rate choice being affected by the 
unconventional monetary policy set by Central Banks and that fixed-rate loans are more 
attractive in a low-interest-rate policy (Moench, Vickery, and Aragon, 2010). In a low interest 
rate environment, households and enterprises try to grant more loans and that leads to an 
increase in the supply of money. Having in mind the quantity theory of money, a boost in the 
money supply causes higher inflation. Given that, an increase in inflation is associated with a low 
interest rate environment.  
Therefore, this inference is also consistent with the concept that in the presence of a higher level 
of volatility inflation, banks protect themselves from that inflation risk through loans attached 
with a fixed interest rate (Campbell, 2012; Badarinza et al., 2017). So, when countries face a 
lower level of volatility inflation, it means that interest rates are higher, and banks are secure to 
provide adjustable rate loans to their borrowers. 
As banks have their asset side (loans and securities) mainly financed by short-term liabilities that 
are also attached to floating rates, when interest rates rise there is an increment in interests of 
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the deposits. If banks hold more fixed-rate assets, in this variation scenario of interest rates, 
banks would face a maturity mismatch, and consequently a reduction in net income. To avoid 
that, and having in mind the risk aversion characteristic of banks, the loans with floating rates 
are the prime choice in terms of lending, since there is a transference of interest-rate risk from 
lenders to borrowers (Kirti, 2017). However, the transfer of risks from lenders to borrowers 
means that borrowers might be more likely to default when interest rates increase, thus 
increasing credit risk in the future. Banks could also use hedging activities to overcome the 
balance sheet mismatch but that might lead to excessive costs.  
Furthermore, these results support the idea that the transmission of monetary policy is 
connected with the share of adjustable-rate loans in an economy (Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca, 
2012; Garriga, Kydland, and Sustek, 2013). 
5.2. Components of profitability  
The following analysis points out the impact that the share of variable-rate loans has on the main 
components of profitability. The components presented are stated in percentage of total assets 
and are the following: 
 Return on assets (%ROA); 
 Net interest income (%NII); 
 Net non-interest income (%NNII); 
 Provisions (%PROV). 
Regarding hypothesis 2, it is also used the ECB shadow rate and the short-term interest rate in 
two different regressions, as part of the country control variables (Table V and Table VI, 
respectively). 
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Table V - Generalized lest squared fixed effect regression results between the share of new loans with floating rate 
and the main profitability components (including shadow rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA NII NNII PROV 
          
FRLshareHNFC 0.0132 -0.00339 0.00435 -0.00186 
 (0.0120) (0.00696) (0.00691) (0.00166) 
ECBShadowRate -0.00634 0.0297*** 0.00694 0.000476 
 (0.00966) (0.00562) (0.00557) (0.00142) 
CountrySlope -0.266*** 0.0309 -0.0590* -0.00226 
 (0.0557) (0.0324) (0.0321) (0.00717) 
GDP_growthrate 0.0580*** -0.00788 -0.00449 0.000988 
 (0.0142) (0.00826) (0.00819) (0.00184) 
HICP 0.0568 -0.0180 0.0181 0.0117 
 (0.0778) (0.0453) (0.0449) (0.0101) 
NWLgrowthHNFC 0.00273** 0.000751 0.000761 -0.000344** 
 (0.00113) (0.000656) (0.000651) (0.000145) 
Constant -0.592 1.507*** 0.476 0.101 
 (0.949) (0.552) (0.548) (0.131) 
     
Observations 216 216 216 195 
R-squared 0.278 0.244 0.053 0.045 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
When the ECB shadow rate is used as a control variable as well as GDP growth, expected 
inflation, country-specific slope and annual growth rate of new loans to households and non-
financial corporations at the same time, the share of loans to households and non-financial 
corporations with a floating rate does not have significant influence on the main components of 




Table VI - Generalized lest squared fixed effect regression results between the share of new loans with floating rate 
and the main profitability components (including short-term rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA NII NNII PROV 
          
FRLshareHNFC 0.00794 0.0127** 0.00688 -0.00130 
 (0.00927) (0.00553) (0.00533) (0.00123) 
ShorttermRate -0.00878 0.167*** 0.0568 -0.00206 
 (0.0688) (0.0410) (0.0396) (0.0100) 
CountrySlope -0.267*** 0.0599* -0.0488 -0.00287 
 (0.0573) (0.0342) (0.0330) (0.00743) 
GDP_growthrate 0.0582*** -0.00930 -0.00492 0.000931 
 (0.0142) (0.00848) (0.00819) (0.00184) 
HICP 0.0548 -0.0212 0.0155 0.0121 
 (0.0780) (0.0465) (0.0449) (0.0102) 
NWLgrowthHNFC 0.00275** 0.000687 0.000747 -0.000345** 
 (0.00113) (0.000673) (0.000650) (0.000145) 
Constant -0.158 0.0604 0.222 0.0572 
 (0.693) (0.413) (0.399) (0.0913) 
     
Observations 216 216 216 195 
R-squared 0.276 0.204 0.056 0.045 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
When the short-term interest rate is considered part of the control variables, including the 
others mentioned above, the share of loans to households and non-financial corporations with 
a floating rate does not have significant influence on ROA, NNII and PROV but has a quite 
significant and positive effect on NII.  
Different impacts in net-interest income are not conclusive. With a higher share of loans 
associated with a variable interest rate, it would be expected a positive sign for NII, and that is 
in line with the results presented in Table VI. A banks’ net interest income would increase with 
higher short-term interest rates, due to the increase in interest rate margins, as well as with a 
steeper yield curve because of the expected maturity transformation returns (Borio, 
Gambacorta and Hofmann, 2015). Undoubtedly, an upward level of interest rates would raise 
the interest payments for borrowers with variable-rate contracts and that would be traduced in 
more earnings for banks through interest income. 
In both outcomes, we are in the presence of a poor significance for ROA, NNII and PROV.  
According to the results of the previous chapter, a growth in the share of variable rate loans 
would imply an increase in interest rates. The upper level of this rate produces different effects 
on these three components referred above. A general boost in profitability was the expected 
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outcome. However, in a higher interest rate context, more loan loss provisions are likely to be 
registered due to higher default probabilities of the borrowers. In fact, interest payments related 
with variable-rate loans rise and, with less disposable income, some consumers might fail to 
reimburse their loan payments. Still in this higher interest rate environment, non-interest 
income component would diminish as a result of the unfavourable consequence for the 
valuation of securities.  
Nevertheless, the results on return-on-assets, non-net interest income and provisions do not 
demonstrate its expected strength. The main reason for the missing significance might be 
related to the noticeable performance of net interest income, with the share of this component 
relative to total revenues demonstrated an increase in the past years, and still being identified 
as the main component of revenues (Schildbach, 2017).  
Additionally, in a variable-rate contract the interest rate risk is transferred from the lender to 
the borrower, but in the presence of higher interest rates, borrowers pay more on interest 
payments and banks need to account for loan losses as part of their provisions. The hedge of 
interest rate risk is done via interest rate swaps and the valuation associated is normally 
registered as non-interest income. Since the overall value for return on assets depend on net 
interest income, non-interest income and provisions, the circumstances stated in this paragraph 
for provisions and non-interest income are not easily capture in this analysis and that might 
justify the weak performance of these three components in the results.  
5.3. Robustness tests  
We conducted a few more analysis to evaluate the previous results of this work.  
First, both hypotheses were tested in countries according to their share of fixed and variables 
rates. That means that one of the tests focused on countries with predominantly fixed interest 
rates and the other one is focused on countries with predominantly variable interest rates. 
Second, there was an attempt to test the hypothesis referred in this work in two different time-
sets: until 2014 (exclusively) and from 2014 until 2018. Finally, it was used the “interest rate up 
to 1 year” instead of the shadow rate or short-term level to capture the interest level related 
with monetary policy.  
All the adjustments set are compared to the main goal of analysis disclosed in hypothesis 1 and 
2. The summary of this differences are exhibited in Table VII and Table VIII, and the tables with 
the coefficients regarding this tests are showed in the Appendix. 
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ECB shadow rate by 
itself is not 
significant; country 
slope combined with 
ECB shadow rate is 
not as significant; ECB 
shadow rate 
improves significance 
when combined with 
the other variables  
When ECB shadow 
rate is combined with 
the country slope, the 
last in negatively 
associated with 
FRLshare; with all 
variables included, 
country slope is also 
negatively associated 
with FRLshare  
Results are similar 
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country slope are not 
significant when they 
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plays alone is less 
significant; when 
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no significance; 
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significance 
Results are similar 
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6. Conclusions  
The financial crisis forced Central Banks to adopt unique methods to overcome the negative 
effects in the financial markets. Because of that, the implication of these new and 
unconventional monetary policies became a subject of study for economists, especially within 
the banking system. Besides the common regulation in this sector, each bank has its own 
specifications according to existing regulation on the country where it operates and to the 
different economic characteristics of each country.  
The purpose of this work was to understand how banks operating in some EU countries select 
the type of rates to give to consumers in this exceptional monetary policy context and how it 
could affect its main profitability channels. According to the main results, monetary policy has a 
material impact on the choice of loans with a floating rate given to households and non-financial 
corporations, but on the other side this decision is not a substantial influence on the profitability 
components, with the exception of the significance found on net interest income. Along with 
this analysis, there was an intention to make some extrapolations about the future, considering 
the rise of interest rates by the European Central Bank. With a simple focus on the outcomes 
perceived, in a higher interest rate environment, banks would be more willing to grant variable-
rates loans and the main components of profitability, in general terms, would not suffer much 
from this interest rate change. 
Despite all that, there are limitations in the analysis, since there are only included ten EU 
countries instead of all EU countries and some values of the four profitability components are 
missing in specific periods. For future work, it would be interesting to find enough data and cover 
all EU countries as well as to introduce more indicators in order to capture other significant 
aspects regarding banks’ characteristics and macro effects of the monetary policies. It is also 
important to assign that the inferences declared in this work are only focused in the results given 
by the included variables and there is a conscientiousness about the other market and country 

















Three-month overnight index swap (OIS): indicator of overall health 
of the banking system; interest rate swap between two financial 
institutions, when one of the institutions swaps an overnight interest 
rate (interest rate the central bank sets to target monetary policy) 
and the other institution swaps a fixed short-term interest rate
CountrySlope
The difference between ten and two-year sovereign yields of the 10 
countries included in this analysis; can advise on the direction in 
which a country's economy is headed
ECBShadowRate
European Central Bank shadow rate, extracted from Jing Cynthia Wu 
website; offers an excellent description of the recent behavior of 
interest rates related with unconventional monetary policies
GDP_growthrate
GDP growth rate: indicator of economic health; shows in which phase 
of the business cycle is a certain country
HICP
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices: measures the change over 
time in the prices of consumer goods and services acquired, used or 
paid for by euro area households
ROA Return on assets [%]; profitability relative to total assets
NII
Net interest income [% of total assets]; the difference between the 
revenue that is generated from a bank's assets and the expenses 
associated with paying its liabilities
NNII
Net non-interest income [% of total assets]; revenue that derives 
from fees and other activities outside the core activity of lending in 
banks
PROV (Provisions) [% of total assets]; set up to cover loan defaults
FRLshareHNFC
Share of new business loans with a floating rate or an initial rate fixed 
for a period of up to 1 year in total new business loans to households 
and non-financial corporations
NWLgrowthHNFC











Table X - Summary statistics of the variables by country 
Country ECBShadowRate ShorttermRate CountrySlope GDP_growthrate HICP ROA NII NNII PROV FRLshareHNFC NWLgrowthHNFC 
Austria 
44 44 44 41 44 25 25 25 25 44 44 
-3.416417 0.5182659 1.459739 1.017073 0.4840909 0.2734819 1.278685 0.8123593 -0.014605 89.5149 12.86246 
8.301894 1.243028 0.6899086 1.846876 0.4936542 0.2474559 0.487831 0.4662203 0.0147424 6.931147 37.79529 
-9.406352 -0.2875 1.084 0.7 0.15 0.1194135 0.8418628 0.4783275 -0.023511 88.70956 -15.20247 
-1.893154 0.105 1.47 1.5 0.4 0.293406 1.554866 0.7556165 -0.011412 93.20883 1.371052 
1.055595 0.59825 1.96275 2 0.8 0.4586684 1.62505 0.8888529 -0.004863 93.80477 35.94958 
-18.91366 -0.3615 0 -3.8 -0.5 -0.355123 0.3821397 0.1681017 -0.046379 70.82014 -37.79546 
12.28134 4.2935 2.8905 3.7 1.9 0.7716722 1.761908 1.666652 0.0092974 94.66773 100.6779 
Belgium 
44 44 44 41 44 26 26 26 26 0 44 
-3.416417 0.5182659 1.546761 1.019512 0.5068182 0.2357106 0.9414341 0.4441331 0.0019957 0 -0.056875 
8.301894 1.243028 0.6841279 1.360004 0.6180983 0.4864913 0.3458184 0.2546644 0.0406529 0 31.16372 
-9.406352 -0.2875 1.123 0.2 0.1 0.1193331 0.630971 0.2294919 -0.016973 0 -23.14033 
-1.893154 0.105 1.49275 1.5 0.4 0.3731802 1.124428 0.4306097 -0.002437 0 -1.153175 
1.055595 0.59825 2.17175 1.7 0.8 0.4790374 1.210895 0.650408 0.0101154 0 10.57494 
-18.91366 -0.3615 0 -2.3 -1 -1.813703 0.2929582 -0.017004 -0.058132 0 -46.52386 
12.28134 4.2935 2.6015 3.4 1.9 0.7115875 1.311081 0.8675386 0.1280377 0 77.99538 
Finland 
44 44 44 41 44 26 26 26 15 38 44 
-3.416417 0.5182659 1.409602 0.1853659 0.4477273 0.4660846 0.8598549 0.5926328 -8.69E-05 95.65386 3.599597 
8.301894 1.243028 0.6618061 3.29557 0.6384897 0.184514 0.38024 0.2686943 0.0001705 1.041759 30.60121 
-9.406352 -0.2875 1.05925 -0.8 0.05 0.365767 0.4810432 0.3904848 -0.000295 94.91297 -16.76815 
-1.893154 0.105 1.4595 0.7 0.3 0.4769352 0.9560735 0.555324 -0.000014 95.70447 -1.30883 
1.055595 0.59825 1.87575 2.6 0.55 0.5674782 1.139349 0.8058712 0.0000204 96.49239 26.14046 
-18.91366 -0.3615 0 -8.3 -0.8 0.137779 0.222877 0.2027913 -0.00038 93.21722 -50.11196 
12.28134 4.2935 2.5795 5.2 2.7 0.9311771 1.489778 1.244031 0.0001563 97.41434 77.7707 
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Country ECBShadowRate ShorttermRate CountrySlope GDP_growthrate HICP ROA NII NNII PROV FRLshareHNFC NWLgrowthHNFC 
France 
44 44 44 41 44 26 26 26 26 44 44 
-3.416417 0.5182659 1.49967 0.8292683 0.3386364 0.2781614 0.826015 0.7842438 -0.009683 40.37726 11.11786 
8.301894 1.243028 0.6565081 1.424121 0.4951936 0.1203194 0.3444037 0.3225655 0.0242096 6.990936 50.29593 
-9.406352 -0.2875 1.14975 0.3 0 0.2101833 0.5100894 0.5331986 -0.014986 36.34555 -31.6224 
-1.893154 0.105 1.55025 1.1 0.3 0.2967327 1.003296 0.8433944 -0.00345 40.80291 -2.093859 
1.055595 0.59825 2.07475 1.9 0.65 0.353847 1.09893 1.056275 0.0008664 45.93606 49.49621 
-18.91366 -0.3615 0 -2.9 -0.9 0.0840342 0.237127 0.2894842 -0.116863 25.67051 -53.43314 
12.28134 4.2935 2.4145 2.4 1.4 0.4632206 1.25318 1.408541 0.019231 53.2002 123.9646 
Germany 
44 44 44 41 44 25 25 25 14 44 44 
-3.416417 0.5182659 1.198682 1.309756 0.3522727 0.0762645 0.7713766 0.4668498 -0.006941 63.59132 -0.936129 
8.301894 1.243028 0.5487618 2.571362 0.4500587 0.1120995 0.2859419 0.2132961 0.005542 6.371224 25.54073 
-9.406352 -0.2875 0.9075 0.5 0 0.0448174 0.5648387 0.2990868 -0.012581 57.84199 -7.308645 
-1.893154 0.105 1.20725 2.2 0.3 0.0811489 0.7990387 0.4355568 -0.004076 63.004 -2.961486 
1.055595 0.59825 1.57725 2.2 0.7 0.1283355 1.003382 0.6208845 -0.003406 67.38528 17.26172 
-18.91366 -0.3615 0 -5.6 -0.5 -0.312608 0.2619001 0.1581145 -0.01829 55.53658 -62.64441 
12.28134 4.2935 2.1355 4.1 1.4 0.2896828 1.126678 0.830848 -0.001415 76.76853 39.80136 
Ireland 
44 44 44 41 44 25 25 25 25 44 44 
-3.416417 0.5182659 1.806614 4.402439 0.0977273 -0.532089 1.234905 0.3506773 -0.013179 83.35524 -29.10829 
8.301894 1.243028 1.459162 8.099645 0.6818199 1.955206 0.4879405 0.6076107 0.1088733 5.682178 68.50085 
-9.406352 -0.2875 0.846 0.2 -0.35 -0.961251 0.9744307 0.1535201 -0.027415 78.72062 -86.02158 
-1.893154 0.105 1.38975 3.7 0.05 0.3247988 1.106632 0.3498337 -0.013598 84.19232 -11.76281 
1.055595 0.59825 2.69875 7.2 0.6 0.6145812 1.542239 0.5644616 -0.003358 87.88218 23.48163 
-18.91366 -0.3615 -1.526 -5 -1.1 -7.256629 0.4289066 -1.613711 -0.396459 72.13783 -147.154 
12.28134 4.2935 6.3825 25.1 1.7 0.8421234 2.198221 1.833922 0.2641297 91.91687 92.08692 
Italy 44 44 44 41 44 26 26 26 26 44 44 
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Country ECBShadowRate ShorttermRate CountrySlope GDP_growthrate HICP ROA NII NNII PROV FRLshareHNFC NWLgrowthHNFC 
-3.416417 0.5182659 1.918068 -0.460976 0.3840909 0.1117152 1.179933 1.003456 -0.051011 88.10745 -5.334581 
8.301894 1.243028 0.7187131 2.200327 0.5489708 0.397231 0.5009254 0.3970836 0.0295848 6.206131 32.47955 
-9.406352 -0.2875 1.379 -1.7 -0.05 0.0830244 0.7019546 0.6848358 -0.070536 84.46516 -30.35845 
-1.893154 0.105 2.00175 0.6 0.3 0.1815937 1.370613 1.040986 -0.052237 91.29698 -17.64864 
1.055595 0.59825 2.45575 1.1 0.85 0.3207522 1.598263 1.331056 -0.029916 93.32421 9.297278 
-18.91366 -0.3615 0 -5.5 -0.5 -0.97529 0.3201284 0.3713433 -0.109694 76.33777 -42.72096 
12.28134 4.2935 2.878 1.7 1.7 0.7435343 1.892859 1.627679 -0.003068 94.64601 86.13334 
Netherlands 
44 44 44 41 44 25 25 25 25 44 44 
-3.416417 0.5182659 1.419886 0.9512195 0.3522727 0.2513748 1.007862 0.3036867 -0.023923 57.84836 3.254167 
8.301894 1.243028 0.6497083 1.932242 0.9461031 0.1891348 0.3714145 0.2209945 0.0311491 8.804232 56.47692 
-9.406352 -0.2875 1.0595 -0.1 -0.3 0.1911942 0.6961457 0.1951387 -0.028539 48.83381 -31.07748 
-1.893154 0.105 1.43475 1.6 0.2 0.281382 1.160155 0.3074412 -0.01519 58.07667 -6.290559 
1.055595 0.59825 1.91825 2.2 0.85 0.3461226 1.284413 0.4954562 -0.005584 63.40802 21.26016 
-18.91366 -0.3615 0 -3.7 -1.4 -0.399633 0.3067485 -0.4736 -0.123758 42.8099 -73.7846 
12.28134 4.2935 2.4445 3.8 2.5 0.5542585 1.44234 0.5502853 0.0016636 75.37512 190.4549 
Portugal 
44 44 44 41 44 26 26 26 26 44 44 
-3.416417 0.5182659 1.88817 -0.065854 0.3386364 -0.111399 1.117649 0.8006941 -0.089435 90.81138 -16.85874 
8.301894 1.243028 1.729942 2.14215 0.7279202 0.524319 0.4491477 0.3683028 0.1754075 6.304759 29.55259 
-9.406352 -0.2875 1.5775 -1.8 -0.15 -0.282289 0.7503329 0.5181913 -0.127156 86.20048 -31.76689 
-1.893154 0.105 2.393 0.9 0.4 -0.017425 1.127498 0.7302574 -0.028983 94.38515 -15.29254 
1.055595 0.59825 2.79125 1.9 0.8 0.1164071 1.451927 1.168144 -0.004048 95.33283 3.363033 
-18.91366 -0.3615 -5.5595 -4 -1.4 -2.022017 0.3151367 0.1767696 -0.846004 78.44925 -73.54298 
12.28134 4.2935 4.125 2.5 2 0.9027226 1.863789 1.346667 0.0878056 96.63254 37.68549 
Spain 
44 44 44 41 44 25 25 25 25 44 44 
-3.416417 0.5182659 1.811602 0.395122 0.3704545 0.2989692 1.475836 0.6752356 -0.107656 85.71043 -25.00307 
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Country ECBShadowRate ShorttermRate CountrySlope GDP_growthrate HICP ROA NII NNII PROV FRLshareHNFC NWLgrowthHNFC 
8.301894 1.243028 0.6910605 2.502794 0.9277579 0.4269941 0.536903 0.2851392 0.0521749 6.375948 32.83638 
-9.406352 -0.2875 1.5205 -1.7 -0.4 0.1782143 0.9932954 0.457796 -0.145498 83.60345 -46.24848 
-1.893154 0.105 1.86025 1.1 0.3 0.4155253 1.726252 0.670266 -0.113425 88.62123 -28.91269 
1.055595 0.59825 2.34775 3 1.1 0.5308731 1.843692 0.9320108 -0.076533 90.44515 -3.012185 
-18.91366 -0.3615 0 -3.6 -1.5 -1.467406 0.4661521 0.2169475 -0.219382 72.56331 -80.90945 
12.28134 4.2935 2.858 3.8 2.4 0.7475685 2.014257 1.088605 -0.016674 92.77276 40.948 
All countries 
440 440 440 410 440 255 255 255 233 390 440 
-3.416417 0.5182659 1.59588 0.9582927 0.3672727 0.136028 1.067701 0.6253897 -0.034052 76.93529 -4.64636 
8.216354 1.23022 0.9492042 3.512888 0.6749145 0.7280691 0.4704363 0.4149994 0.0816891 18.8282 43.51639 
-9.406352 -0.2875 1.10225 0 -0.1 0.0862367 0.708375 0.3498337 -0.047193 62.92104 -29.9304 
-1.893154 0.105 1.626 1.2 0.3 0.2543572 1.09893 0.5689793 -0.013598 84.21708 -6.812314 
1.055595 0.59825 2.199 2.2 0.7 0.4312018 1.412691 0.8644373 -0.002004 93.25411 17.54563 
-18.91366 -0.3615 -5.5595 -8.3 -1.5 -7.256629 0.222877 -1.613711 -0.846004 25.67051 -147.154 
12.28134 4.2935 6.3825 25.1 2.7 0.9311771 2.198221 1.833922 0.2641297 97.41434 190.4549 
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Table XI - Robustness test for hypothesis 1:  countries with predominantly fixed interest rates (using ECB shadow 
rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC 
              
ECBShadowRate 0.692***  0.650*** 0.670***  0.689*** 
 (0.0507)  (0.0480) (0.0491)  (0.0478) 
CountrySlope  4.581*** 2.945***  0.857 2.104*** 
  (0.983) (0.643)  (1.111) (0.671) 
GDP_growthrate    -1.315*** -1.460*** -1.098*** 
    (0.176) (0.304) (0.184) 
HICP    0.564 1.461* 0.566 
    (0.516) (0.824) (0.498) 
NWLgrowthHNFC    -0.0167** -0.0456*** -0.00602 
    (0.00799) (0.0133) (0.00843) 
Constant 56.30*** 47.65*** 52.12*** 57.25*** 54.45*** 54.03*** 
 (0.451) (1.478) (1.004) (0.435) (1.852) (1.110) 
       
Observations 132 132 132 123 123 123 
R-squared 0.593 0.145 0.650 0.748 0.349 0.768 
Number of countrynumb 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
     
 
Table XII - Robustness test for hypothesis 1:  countries with predominantly fixed interest rates (using short-term 
rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC 
              
ShorttermRate 3.435***  4.470*** 3.214***  4.368*** 
 (0.435)  (0.328) (0.345)  (0.322) 
CountrySlope  4.581*** 7.172***  0.857 5.933*** 
  (0.983) (0.656)  (1.111) (0.787) 
GDP_growthrate    -1.648*** -1.460*** -1.090*** 
    (0.214) (0.304) (0.191) 
HICP    0.343 1.461* 0.0222 
    (0.636) (0.824) (0.524) 
NWLgrowthHNFC    -0.0419*** -0.0456*** -0.0117 
    (0.00933) (0.0133) (0.00865) 
Constant 52.16*** 47.65*** 41.78*** 54.34*** 54.45*** 44.62*** 
 (0.580) (1.478) (1.038) (0.536) (1.852) (1.362) 
       
Observations 132 132 132 123 123 123 
R-squared 0.328 0.145 0.653 0.626 0.349 0.750 
Number of countrynumb 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Standard errors in parentheses      





Table XIII - Robustness test for hypothesis 1:  countries with predominantly variable interest rates (using ECB 
shadow rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC 
              
ECBShadowRate 0.504***  0.513*** 0.434***  0.455*** 
 (0.0306)  (0.0292) (0.0326)  (0.0330) 
CountrySlope  0.909*** 1.148***  -0.0827 0.622*** 
  (0.333) (0.224)  (0.299) (0.227) 
GDP_growthrate    -0.164** -0.441*** -0.130** 
    (0.0643) (0.0818) (0.0647) 
HICP    -1.033*** 0.0760 -0.983*** 
    (0.342) (0.444) (0.338) 
NWLgrowthHNFC    -0.0241*** -0.0180** -0.0199*** 
    (0.00605) (0.00832) (0.00616) 
Constant 90.41*** 87.13*** 88.46*** 90.68*** 89.77*** 89.62*** 
 (0.273) (0.678) (0.461) (0.289) (0.645) (0.478) 
       
Observations 258 258 258 240 240 240 
R-squared 0.520 0.029 0.565 0.531 0.168 0.546 
Number of countrynumb 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
Table XIV - Robustness test for hypothesis 1:  countries with predominantly variable interest rates (using short-term 
rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC 
              
ShorttermRate 1.594***  2.083*** 1.418***  1.603*** 
 (0.276)  (0.278) (0.251)  (0.268) 
CountrySlope  0.909*** 1.701***  -0.0827 0.566* 
  (0.333) (0.320)  (0.299) (0.299) 
GDP_growthrate    -0.328*** -0.441*** -0.295*** 
    (0.0785) (0.0818) (0.0801) 
HICP    -0.681 0.0760 -0.687 
    (0.436) (0.444) (0.433) 
NWLgrowthHNFC    -0.0319*** -0.0180** -0.0296*** 
    (0.00795) (0.00832) (0.00799) 
Constant 87.86*** 87.13*** 84.67*** 88.75*** 89.77*** 87.64*** 
 (0.372) (0.678) (0.696) (0.379) (0.645) (0.699) 
       
Observations 258 258 258 240 240 240 
R-squared 0.117 0.029 0.207 0.269 0.168 0.281 
Number of countrynumb 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Standard errors in parentheses      





Table XV - Robustness test for hypothesis 1:  until 2014 (using ECB shadow rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC 
              
ECBShadowRate 0.0531  0.140** 0.189***  0.255*** 
 (0.0482)  (0.0603) (0.0598)  (0.0680) 
CountrySlope  0.252 0.630**  0.0431 0.512** 
  (0.212) (0.266)  (0.231) (0.256) 
GDP_growthrate    -0.455*** -0.331*** -0.440*** 
    (0.0959) (0.0938) (0.0955) 
HICP    -0.156 -0.0887 -0.0981 
    (0.311) (0.319) (0.310) 
NWLgrowthHNFC    -0.0153* -0.000310 -0.0150* 
    (0.00784) (0.00694) (0.00779) 
Constant 80.72*** 80.40*** 79.40*** 80.10*** 80.74*** 79.02*** 
 (0.258) (0.446) (0.616) (0.372) (0.487) (0.658) 
       
Observations 222 222 222 222 222 222 
R-squared 0.006 0.007 0.032 0.109 0.066 0.126 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
Table XVI - Robustness test for hypothesis 1:  until 2014 (using short-term rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC 
              
ShorttermRate 0.197  0.495** 0.628***  0.833*** 
 (0.168)  (0.208) (0.209)  (0.235) 
CountrySlope  0.252 0.627**  0.0431 0.469* 
  (0.212) (0.263)  (0.231) (0.255) 
GDP_growthrate    -0.427*** -0.331*** -0.405*** 
    (0.0934) (0.0938) (0.0937) 
HICP    -0.241 -0.0887 -0.217 
    (0.314) (0.319) (0.313) 
NWLgrowthHNFC    -0.0147* -0.000310 -0.0143* 
    (0.00787) (0.00694) (0.00783) 
Constant 80.63*** 80.40*** 79.18*** 79.91*** 80.74*** 78.84*** 
 (0.296) (0.446) (0.674) (0.423) (0.487) (0.715) 
       
Observations 222 222 222 222 222 222 
R-squared 0.006 0.007 0.033 0.105 0.066 0.119 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses      





Table XVII - Robustness test for hypothesis 1: 2014 to 2018 (using ECB shadow rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC 
              
ECBShadowRate 0.740***  0.780*** 0.790***  0.814*** 
 (0.0504)  (0.0534) (0.0551)  (0.0551) 
CountrySlope  1.773** -1.195**  0.250 -1.676** 
  (0.824) (0.575)  (1.134) (0.702) 
GDP_growthrate    -0.164* -0.204 -0.166* 
    (0.0927) (0.150) (0.0910) 
HICP    -0.537 -1.804** -0.360 
    (0.479) (0.766) (0.476) 
NWLgrowthHNFC    -0.00515 -0.0234** -0.00711 
    (0.00711) (0.0114) (0.00704) 
Constant 79.85*** 69.36*** 81.90*** 80.68*** 73.22*** 83.33*** 
 (0.611) (1.188) (1.157) (0.621) (1.750) (1.266) 
       
Observations 168 168 168 141 141 141 
R-squared 0.577 0.029 0.588 0.650 0.088 0.665 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
Table XVIII - Robustness test for hypothesis 1: 2014 to 2018 (using short-term rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC 
              
ShorttermRate 22.78***  23.34*** 21.79***  23.36*** 
 (1.667)  (1.749) (1.705)  (1.703) 
CountrySlope  1.773** -0.632  0.250 -2.545*** 
  (0.824) (0.594)  (1.134) (0.751) 
GDP_growthrate    -0.179* -0.204 -0.182* 
    (0.0991) (0.150) (0.0953) 
HICP    -0.664 -1.804** -0.374 
    (0.511) (0.766) (0.499) 
NWLgrowthHNFC    0.00673 -0.0234** 0.00506 
    (0.00785) (0.0114) (0.00757) 
Constant 76.92*** 69.36*** 77.90*** 77.34*** 73.22*** 81.30*** 
 (0.467) (1.188) (1.037) (0.496) (1.750) (1.261) 
       
Observations 168 168 168 141 141 141 
R-squared 0.542 0.029 0.545 0.599 0.088 0.633 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses      





Table XIX - Robustness test for hypothesis 1, using interest rate up to 1 year 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC FRLshareHNFC 
              
IRoutstandingtHNFC1year 3.323***  3.649*** 2.986***  3.280*** 
 (0.220)  (0.203) (0.204)  (0.207) 
CountrySlope  1.431*** 2.245***  0.107 1.286*** 
  (0.337) (0.252)  (0.325) (0.259) 
GDP_growthrate    -0.282*** -0.527*** -0.201*** 
    (0.0708) (0.0883) (0.0704) 
HICP    -0.232 0.564 -0.156 
    (0.334) (0.420) (0.324) 
NWLgrowthHNFC    -0.0454*** -0.0322*** -0.0385*** 
    (0.00562) (0.00734) (0.00561) 
Constant 65.60*** 74.64*** 60.89*** 67.16*** 77.51*** 63.94*** 
 (0.792) (0.628) (0.895) (0.768) (0.645) (0.986) 
       
Observations 390 390 390 363 363 363 
R-squared 0.376 0.045 0.484 0.498 0.192 0.531 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
Table XX - Robustness test for hypothesis 2:  countries with predominantly fixed interest rates (using ECB shadow 
rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA NII NNII PROV 
          
FRLshareHNFC -0.0120*** -0.00696 -0.0142 -0.000510 
 (0.00447) (0.00913) (0.00850) (0.000867) 
ECBShadowRate 0.00373 0.00780 0.00883 0.000275 
 (0.00414) (0.00844) (0.00786) (0.000818) 
CountrySlope 0.0814** 0.299*** 0.0552 0.00738 
 (0.0374) (0.0763) (0.0711) (0.00739) 
GDP_growthrate 0.0200* -0.00351 -0.0317 -0.00396 
 (0.0118) (0.0240) (0.0224) (0.00330) 
HICP 0.0366 -0.0745 0.110* 0.0182*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0638) (0.0594) (0.00646) 
NWLgrowthHNFC -0.000376 -0.000543 -0.000303 0.000133* 
 (0.000360) (0.000734) (0.000684) (7.03e-05) 
Constant 0.702*** 0.908* 1.269** 0.00243 
 (0.254) (0.517) (0.481) (0.0475) 
     
Observations 73 73 73 62 
R-squared 0.246 0.356 0.111 0.184 
Number of countrynumb 3 3 3 3 
Standard errors in parentheses    




Table XXI - Robustness test for hypothesis 2:  countries with predominantly fixed interest rates (using short-term 
rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA NII NNII PROV 
          
FRLshareHNFC -0.0119*** -0.00360 -0.0185** -0.000491 
 (0.00426) (0.00873) (0.00791) (0.000817) 
ShorttermRate 0.0321 0.0325 0.128** 0.00225 
 (0.0338) (0.0693) (0.0628) (0.00655) 
CountrySlope 0.0968** 0.321*** 0.108 0.00824 
 (0.0383) (0.0786) (0.0713) (0.00765) 
GDP_growthrate 0.0180 -0.00330 -0.0432* -0.00425 
 (0.0123) (0.0253) (0.0229) (0.00349) 
HICP 0.0308 -0.0853 0.0945 0.0177*** 
 (0.0309) (0.0633) (0.0574) (0.00634) 
NWLgrowthHNFC -0.000357 -0.000545 -0.000198 0.000135* 
 (0.000361) (0.000741) (0.000672) (7.12e-05) 
Constant 0.652*** 0.660 1.368*** -0.00125 
 (0.207) (0.424) (0.384) (0.0393) 
     
Observations 73 73 73 62 
R-squared 0.247 0.350 0.148 0.184 
Number of countrynumb 3 3 3 3 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Table XXII - Robustness test for hypothesis 2:  countries with predominantly variable interest rates (using ECB 
shadow rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA NII NNII PROV 
          
FRLshareHNFC 0.0108 -0.00146 0.0123 -0.00251 
 (0.0177) (0.00949) (0.00976) (0.00249) 
ECBShadowRate -0.0106 0.0343*** 0.00604 0.000744 
 (0.0132) (0.00706) (0.00726) (0.00203) 
CountrySlope -0.308*** 0.0164 -0.0624 -0.00467 
 (0.0688) (0.0370) (0.0380) (0.00892) 
GDP_growthrate 0.0412** -0.00959 -0.00328 0.00230 
 (0.0179) (0.00963) (0.00990) (0.00231) 
HICP 0.105 -0.0110 -0.0151 0.00736 
 (0.107) (0.0576) (0.0592) (0.0139) 
NWLgrowthHNFC 0.00649*** 0.00190** 0.00159 -0.000705*** 
 (0.00178) (0.000958) (0.000984) (0.000232) 
Constant -0.433 1.562* -0.180 0.165 
 (1.620) (0.870) (0.894) (0.228) 
     
Observations 143 143 143 133 
R-squared 0.360 0.295 0.098 0.083 
Number of countrynumb 6 6 6 6 
Standard errors in parentheses    




Table XXIII - Robustness test for hypothesis 2:  countries with predominantly variable interest rates (using short-
term rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA NII NNII PROV 
          
FRLshareHNFC 0.00198 0.0195*** 0.0148** -0.00179 
 (0.0132) (0.00718) (0.00726) (0.00172) 
ShorttermRate -0.0268 0.216*** 0.0586 -0.000148 
 (0.0905) (0.0491) (0.0497) (0.0138) 
CountrySlope -0.311*** 0.0507 -0.0525 -0.00500 
 (0.0710) (0.0386) (0.0390) (0.00928) 
GDP_growthrate 0.0413** -0.00875 -0.00292 0.00224 
 (0.0180) (0.00978) (0.00989) (0.00232) 
HICP 0.0975 -0.00536 -0.0169 0.00798 
 (0.107) (0.0584) (0.0590) (0.0139) 
NWLgrowthHNFC 0.00652*** 0.00163* 0.00152 -0.000705*** 
 (0.00179) (0.000973) (0.000983) (0.000232) 
Constant 0.411 -0.573 -0.460 0.0980 
 (1.164) (0.633) (0.640) (0.150) 
     
Observations 143 143 143 133 
R-squared 0.358 0.275 0.102 0.082 
Number of countrynumb 6 6 6 6 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Table XXIV - Robustness test for hypothesis 2: until 2014 (using ECB shadow rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA NII NNII PROV 
          
FRLshareHNFC 0.000389 -0.0105* 0.00852 -0.00634** 
 (0.0294) (0.00631) (0.0156) (0.00290) 
ECBShadowRate -0.0200 0.0130* -0.00262 -0.00271 
 (0.0306) (0.00657) (0.0162) (0.00284) 
CountrySlope -0.340*** -0.0280 -0.120** 0.00321 
 (0.0917) (0.0197) (0.0485) (0.00806) 
GDP_growthrate 0.0213 -0.0241** -0.0189 0.00837* 
 (0.0452) (0.00970) (0.0239) (0.00446) 
HICP 0.00848 0.0357 0.136 0.0255 
 (0.177) (0.0380) (0.0937) (0.0172) 
NWLgrowthHNFC 0.00349 0.000885 0.000775 -0.000625** 
 (0.00281) (0.000604) (0.00149) (0.000254) 
Constant 0.685 2.238*** 0.274 0.442* 
 (2.370) (0.508) (1.254) (0.234) 
     
Observations 93 93 93 73 
R-squared 0.197 0.214 0.120 0.309 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 7 
Standard errors in parentheses    




Table XXV - Robustness test for hypothesis 2: until 2014 (using short-term rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA NII NNII PROV 
          
FRLshareHNFC -0.000651 -0.00970 0.00758 -0.00626** 
 (0.0294) (0.00640) (0.0156) (0.00292) 
ShorttermRate -0.0569 0.0334 0.0132 -0.00615 
 (0.124) (0.0271) (0.0658) (0.0115) 
CountrySlope -0.334*** -0.0331 -0.112** 0.00476 
 (0.0929) (0.0202) (0.0490) (0.00805) 
GDP_growthrate 0.0162 -0.0202** -0.0224 0.00746* 
 (0.0442) (0.00960) (0.0233) (0.00436) 
HICP 0.0318 0.0202 0.141 0.0296* 
 (0.172) (0.0375) (0.0911) (0.0166) 
NWLgrowthHNFC 0.00331 0.00103* 0.000584 -0.000648** 
 (0.00283) (0.000615) (0.00149) (0.000258) 
Constant 0.762 2.181*** 0.318 0.432* 
 (2.368) (0.515) (1.251) (0.235) 
     
Observations 93 93 93 73 
R-squared 0.195 0.190 0.121 0.302 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 7 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Table XXVI - Robustness test for hypothesis 2: 2014 to 2018 (using ECB shadow rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA NII NNII PROV 
          
FRLshareHNFC -0.0122 -0.00228 -0.00305 -0.00139 
 (0.00813) (0.0130) (0.00904) (0.00262) 
ECBShadowRate -0.00693 0.0151 1.21e-05 -0.000899 
 (0.00880) (0.0140) (0.00978) (0.00286) 
CountrySlope 0.0258 0.371*** 0.106 -0.0265 
 (0.0696) (0.111) (0.0774) (0.0225) 
GDP_growthrate 0.000327 -0.0166 -0.00467 0.000798 
 (0.00818) (0.0131) (0.00910) (0.00263) 
HICP -0.0359 -0.179** -0.104** -0.000265 
 (0.0433) (0.0692) (0.0482) (0.0140) 
NWLgrowthHNFC -0.000379 -8.78e-05 0.000313 -0.000203 
 (0.000647) (0.00103) (0.000719) (0.000208) 
Constant 1.013 0.843 0.705 0.0872 
 (0.688) (1.098) (0.765) (0.222) 
     
Observations 123 123 123 122 
R-squared 0.101 0.166 0.059 0.030 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses    




Table XXVII - Robustness test for hypothesis 2: 2014 to 2018 (using short-term rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA NII NNII PROV 
          
FRLshareHNFC -0.0112 0.000644 -0.00222 3.06e-05 
 (0.00783) (0.0126) (0.00873) (0.00251) 
ShorttermRate -0.261 0.345 -0.0366 -0.0927 
 (0.260) (0.416) (0.289) (0.0844) 
CountrySlope 0.0330 0.367*** 0.108 -0.0227 
 (0.0703) (0.113) (0.0783) (0.0226) 
GDP_growthrate 0.000765 -0.0163 -0.00446 0.00118 
 (0.00819) (0.0131) (0.00912) (0.00263) 
HICP -0.0379 -0.180** -0.105** -0.00179 
 (0.0434) (0.0695) (0.0483) (0.0139) 
NWLgrowthHNFC -0.000532 0.000133 0.000295 -0.000252 
 (0.000658) (0.00105) (0.000733) (0.000211) 
Constant 0.946 0.556 0.634 -0.0329 
 (0.645) (1.033) (0.718) (0.207) 
     
Observations 123 123 123 122 
R-squared 0.104 0.162 0.059 0.040 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Table XXVIII - Robustness test for hypothesis 2, using interest rate up to 1 year 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA NII NNII PROV 
          
FRLshareHNFC 0.00109 0.0117* 0.00818 -0.000152 
 (0.0106) (0.00648) (0.00616) (0.00141) 
IRoutstandingtHNFC1year 0.0554 0.109*** 0.0228 -0.0119 
 (0.0624) (0.0380) (0.0361) (0.00882) 
CountrySlope -0.255*** 0.0479 -0.0555* -0.00492 
 (0.0568) (0.0346) (0.0329) (0.00734) 
GDP_growthrate 0.0586*** -0.00737 -0.00439 0.000690 
 (0.0142) (0.00865) (0.00822) (0.00184) 
HICP 0.0595 0.00700 0.0237 0.0107 
 (0.0778) (0.0474) (0.0451) (0.0101) 
NWLgrowthHNFC 0.00260** 0.000388 0.000684 -0.000315** 
 (0.00114) (0.000694) (0.000660) (0.000146) 
Constant 0.163 -0.170 0.0708 0.0119 
 (0.689) (0.420) (0.399) (0.0897) 
     
Observations 216 216 216 195 
R-squared 0.279 0.173 0.048 0.054 
Number of countrynumb 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses    
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